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INTRODUCTION 
Two of the Supreme Court’s drier whistleblower cases 
turned on how to define mundane words, but they are terrific 
examples of similar judges interpreting text very differently. 
Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean1 actually turned 
on a question you would think the Court resolved a century or 
two ago: how to define “law.” Federal employee whistleblowers 
are unprotected if they disclosed something kept secret “by 
law”; does forbidden by law mean only by statute, or also 
forbidden by other “law” sources, like regulations? Kellogg 
Brown & Root v. U.S., ex rel. Carter,2 a False Claims Act3 case 
alleging military contractor corruption, turned on how to define 
two similarly prosaic terms: (1) when a lawsuit is “pending” so 
as to bar a similar later suit; and (2) whether “offenses” 
triggering a relaxed limitations period include only criminal, or 
also civil, violations. 
Except to lawyers practicing federal employee 
whistleblower or False Claims Act litigation, the holdings were 
the least interesting aspects of these cases. The Court ruled for 
the plaintiff in both: in MacLean, holding that federal employee 
whistleblowers do something forbidden “by law” if they violate 
only a statute, not a regulation; and in Kellogg Brown & Root, 
holding that civil (rather than criminal) violations are not 
“offenses” triggering a relaxed limitations period, but also that 
the only prior similar lawsuits sufficiently “pending” to 
preclude a later suit are those still actively being litigated (not 
already-terminated prior suits). But the cases are more broadly 
informative to litigators with any types of cases, at any level, 
because they show how even ideologically similar judges can 
vary widely in their views of textualism, and thus can interpret 
statutes in very different ways. Lawyers and analysts viewing 
judges in purely ideological terms can miss such distinctions, 
and thus can fail to notice important differences in how 
different judges decide cases. 
Part I below details how diametrically opposed views of 
textualism explain the infrequent but significant 
disagreements between two otherwise very similar Justices: 
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. Their 
 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015). 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015). 
 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
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opinions in MacLean and Kellogg Brown & Root, respectively, 
so illustrate: whereas Justice Alito cited dictionary definitions 
yet little caselaw in applying pure textualism to statutory 
questions, Chief Justice Roberts applied purposivism, mixing 
analysis of the text, of Congress’s subjective intentions, and of 
his own view of whistleblower policy. Their opposing views of 
textualism left them on the same sides in these cases, but 
explain their divergence on the recent high-profile Obamacare 
cases, King v. Burwell4 and National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.5 
Part II details how federal district judges display the same 
variation as the Justices in their use of textualism. A review of 
all decisions over twenty-five years by all thirteen judges in one 
federal district (the District of Colorado) confirms that district 
judges run the gamut: some decide cases by relying on 
dictionary definitions every bit as frequently as Justices Alito, 
Thomas, and Scalia; others rely on dictionaries much less often, 
and some never do. The variation among the judges is 
statistically significant, meaning that while random chance 
could account for some fluctuation in judges’ rates of dictionary 
citations, the most frequent and least frequent dictionary-citers 
differ from the average by more than random fluctuation could 
explain. Critically, while the three most textualist Justices are 
also the most conservative, that pattern does not hold among 
district judges. 
Part II details not only the Colorado data, but an identical 
examination of dictionary reliance by five of the most 
conservative and five of the most liberal district judges in the 
nation. Those ten judges’ dictionary reliance shows no 
correlation to their ideologies; those citing dictionaries 
significantly more than average include some of the most well-
known conservative judges and some of the most well-known 
liberal judges. These findings confirm that while textualism 
has earned a conservative reputation from the three most 
conservative Justices being the most textualist, that pattern 
may be happenstance, because it does not hold in the lower 
courts. With some conservative judges relying infrequently on 
dictionaries and some liberal judges relying frequently, a 
litigator in a lower court errs if she decides whether to make 
 
 4. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
8. 88.1 MOSS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2016  2:54 PM 
4 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
textualist arguments based on the judge’s ideology—an 
important litigation strategy recommendation based on the 
findings of this Article that the Conclusion details. 
I.  ROBERTS V. ALITO: STRIKING SIMILARITIES – EXCEPT AS TO 
STATUTORY TEXTUALISM 
In many ways, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice 
Samuel Alito are as similar as judges can be: less than five 
years apart in age, President George W. Bush appointed both 
in 2005, and by one recent four-year tally, they vote together 
an astounding 93% of the time—more often than commonly 
matched pairs like Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas (86%); Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia 
Sotomayor (90%); and narrowly edged out by only one other 
pair, Justices Ginsburg and Elena Kagan (94%).6 Especially 
through Roberts’s and Alito’s first several years together on the 
Court, analysts noted how their “similar voting records” 
matched more tightly than those of other groups of Justices 
appointed by the same President.7 
But despite the similarities between Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito, their opinions show very different statutory 
interpretation methods. They deployed markedly different 
statutory interpretation methodologies in Department of 
 
 6. Jeremy Bowers et al., Which Supreme Court Justices Vote Together Most 
and Least Often, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2014, http://nyti.ms/To4ocP 
[https://perma.cc/C3QT-7VBR] (analyzing cases from all 280 signed decisions in 
argued cases during the four Supreme Court terms spanning fall 2010 to spring 
2014). 
  7. See Christine Kexel Chabot & Benjamin Remy Chabot, Mavericks, 
Moderates, or Drifters? Supreme Court Voting Alignments, 1838-2009, 76 MO. 
L. REV. 999, 1001 (2011). Chabot & Chabot assert: 
[T]he results of presidents’ Supreme Court appointments are mixed. 
Consider the different experiences of George H.W. Bush and his son. 
Both of George W. Bush’s appointees, John Roberts and Samuel Alito, 
have similar voting records, which are thought to align with executive 
preferences. The first Bush Administration did not fare as well. While 
Justice Clarence Thomas votes with Republican appointees at a high 
rate, David Souter voted with Democratic appointees at just as high a 
rate. 
Id. See also Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1045, 1091 (2009) (“The evidence on Justice Alito suggests he is similar in 
minimalism to Chief Justice Roberts.”). 
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Homeland Security v. MacLean8 (a Roberts majority opinion) 
and Kellogg Brown & Root v. U.S., ex rel Carter9 (an Alito 
majority opinion), as Section I.A details. Section I.B then 
elaborates that this methodological difference helps explain the 
few but high-profile differences between the votes Roberts and 
Alito cast—most notably, their votes in the “Obamacare” cases, 
King v. Burwell10 and National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.11 Those methodological differences extend 
beyond the Supreme Court; as Part II details, federal district 
judges display the same ideology-defying divergence in 
statutory interpretation methodology. 
A. Alito’s Textualism in Kellogg Brown & Root versus 
Roberts’s Purposivism in MacLean 
Justice Alito’s Kellogg Brown & Root opinion pounded 
textualism, and little else. Dictionary definitions were the 
authority for holding that a statute suspending limitations 
periods for fraud “offenses” applied only to criminal, not civil, 
violations. Specifically, when Congress enacted the statutory 
language in the 1940s, then re-enacted it later, dictionaries 
defined “offenses” as including only crimes, not civil 
violations.12 Hinting that the Supreme Court library’s 
“dictionaries” section must be quite impressive, Justice Alito 
cited three editions of Black’s Law Dictionary spanning 1933 to 
2004, the 1948 edition of Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, two 
editions of Webster’s New International Dictionary (from 1942 
and 1976), and one of the American Heritage Dictionary (from 
1992).13 The number of dictionaries Justice Alito cited in that 
section (seven) is more than double the number of cases he 
cited (three).14 Justice Alito went beyond dictionaries mainly to 
note a textual difference between statutory provisions: an 
earlier version of the statute defined the relevant offenses as 
“indictable” wrongs, indicating that Congress meant to 
reference “crimes”; and the statute resides in Title 18 of the 
United States Code, which repeatedly defines only crimes as 
 
 8. 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015). 
 9. 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015). 
 10. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 11. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 12. 135 S. Ct. at 1976. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
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“offenses.”15 Justice Alito’s analysis of the other statutory term, 
“pending,” had a similar ratio of dictionaries cited (two) to 
cases cited (one)—only Marbury v. Madison, and not for any 
point of law, but solely as an example of how a long-ago-ended 
case is no longer “pending”: 
[A]s petitioners see things, the first-filed action remains 
“pending” even after it has been dismissed, and it forever 
bars any subsequent related action. This interpretation does 
not comport with any known usage of the term “pending.” 
Under this interpretation, Marbury v. Madison is still 
“pending.” So is the trial of Socrates.16 
There is nothing inherently wrong with Justice Alito’s 
heavy reliance on dictionaries first, inter-statutory contrasts 
second, and caselaw and policy considerations either tied for a 
distant third or excluded entirely. His analysis is detailed, 
careful, and persuasive, and this Article, in analyzing how and 
when judges engage in textualism, does not engage in the 
longstanding debate over the pros and cons of textualism. But 
although Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion in Kellogg Brown & Root, Roberts’s own analyses of 
statutes are very different, as MacLean shows. 
Roberts is not overtly hostile to textualism; one of his 
points in MacLean was a comparison of the texts of different 
statutory provisions: 
Throughout Section 2302, Congress repeatedly used the 
phrase “law, rule, or regulation.” . . . In contrast, Congress 
did not use the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in the 
statutory language at issue here; it used the word “law” . . . . 
Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it 
in another.17 
But to Roberts, textualism is just one among several 
methods of analysis, no more privileged than policy 
 
 15. Id. at 1977. 
 16. Id. at 1979 (citation omitted) (holding that “an earlier suit bars a later 
suit while the earlier suit remains undecided but ceases to bar that suit once it is 
dismissed”). 
 17. Department of Homeland Security v. Maclean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015). 
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considerations. His MacLean opinion expressly relied upon his 
view of which interpretation most likely reflected Congress’s 
subjective intent and his own view of the statutory purpose: 
If “law” included agency rules and regulations, then an 
agency could insulate itself . . . merely by promulgating a 
regulation that “specifically prohibited” whistleblowing. But 
Congress passed the whistleblower statute precisely 
because it did not trust agencies to regulate whistleblowers 
within their ranks. Thus, it is unlikely that Congress meant 
to include rules and regulations within the word “law.”18 
It is hard to see Justices Alito, Scalia, or Thomas writing 
anything like the above passage relying on what Congress 
“[]likely . . . meant” and finding relevant that “Congress passed 
the . . . statute because” of certain policy motivations about 
“trust.” Instead, the Court’s textualists “refuse to consider the 
debating history of statutes as relevant context.”19 The 
preceding quotation addressed Justices Scalia and Thomas in 
1998, but the past decade shows that Justice Alito has joined 
that Scalia/Thomas textualist camp, while Chief Justice 
Roberts definitely has not. 
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts fits within the category of 
“pragmatists and purposivists, who are concerned with 
enabling judges to adapt old statutes to new problems and who 
believe [in] the process of legal reasoning from text, legislative 
purpose, and precedent” alike.20 In so defining that 
methodology, statutory interpretation scholar William 
Eskridge considers “Justice Breyer, a liberal[,] . . . the Court’s 
best representative of a pragmatic or purposivist approach,” 
along with Justice Ginsburg.21 Of course, judges’ views of 
textualism fall along a spectrum: on one occasion, Justice 
Breyer opined against Roberts’s use of a dictionary to analyze a 
statute;22 on another, Justice Thomas detailed a “primary 
 
 18. Id. at 920. 
 19. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read the Federalist 
but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1998). 
 20. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. 
by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 533 (2013). 
 21. Id. at 550–51. 
 22. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 612 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing Roberts majority opinion: “neither dictionary 
definitions nor the use of the word ‘license’ in an unrelated statute can 
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purpose” of the statute that “support[ed] the inclusive 
interpretation” his opinion adopted.23 But the existence of grey 
area as to Justices’ use of textualism does not alter the overall 
picture that Roberts is closer methodologically to Breyer/
Ginsburg “purposivism” than Scalia/Thomas “textualism,” as 
Eskridge defines each: “methodology that focuses on statutory 
text and considers committee reports generated by the 
legislative process that produced the statute (Breyer and 
Ginsburg’s purposivism) . . . [rather] than a methodology that 
focuses on statutory text and considers ‘valid canons’ created 
by judges (Scalia and Thomas’s new textualism).”24 
Does this Alito-Roberts distinction lack a difference, given 
their strong pattern of voting together? To be sure, their 
differing methodologies do not prevent them from voting 
together, and they even joined each other’s opinions in 
MacLean and Kellogg Brown & Root. But their methodologies 
explain their differing views on the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), a.k.a. Obamacare.25 
B. Alito’s Textualism versus Roberts’s Purposivism in the 
Health Care Cases: NFIB v. Sebelius and King v. 
Burwell 
In adjudicating the PPACA, Chief Justice Roberts first 
parted ways with Justice Alito and the other textualists when 
he wrote the majority opinion upholding the PPACA against 
constitutional challenge in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).26 NFIB drew the most attention 
for its two-part constitutional ruling: first, that Congress’s 
power “To regulate Commerce”27 does not allow mandating a 
 
demonstrate what scope Congress intended the word ‘licensing’ to have as it used 
that word in this federal statute.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 23. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (majority opinion by 
Thomas, J.) (holding that because a retaliation statute’s protection of “employees” 
was “ambiguous as to whether it includes former employees,” the statute should 
be deemed to include them for “consistency with a primary purpose of 
antiretaliation provisions: . . . access to statutory remedial mechanisms. . . . [I]t 
would be destructive of this purpose . . . for an employer to be able to retaliate 
with impunity[,] . . . [which] support[s] the inclusive interpretation . . . .”). 
 24. Eskridge, Reading Law, supra note 20, at 551. 
 25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
 26. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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purchase (there, of health insurance); but, second, that 
Congress’s power “To lay and collect Taxes”28 allows imposing a 
tax penalty for not making such a purchase. For illustrating 
the Court’s varied views on textualism, however, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s varied treatment of the word “tax” is more notable. 
On the one hand, Chief Justice Roberts held that the tax 
penalty for not purchasing insurance qualified as a “tax” 
sufficiently to be an authorized exercise of the power: “That 
constitutional question was not controlled by Congress’s choice 
of label. We have . . . held that exactions not labeled taxes 
nonetheless were authorized by Congress’s power to tax,” 
Roberts explained, expressly declaring a “functional approach” 
instead of the opposing purely textual approach that a payment 
is a “tax” only if the statutory text says “tax.”29 On the other 
hand, he held that the same penalty was not a “tax” for 
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act’s rule that “no suit for the 
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax 
shall be maintained in any court,”30 because “taxes can 
ordinarily be challenged only after they are paid, by suing for a 
refund.”31 In response to the argument that if the penalty is 
constitutionally authorized as a “tax,” then it must be a “tax” 
protected from litigation by the Anti-Injunction Act, Chief 
Justice Roberts began with a concession: “It is true that 
Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a 
penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as 
one or the other.”32 But he elaborated that, for statutory 
purposes, Congress may use words however it intends. “The 
Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, are 
creatures of Congress’s own creation. How they relate to each 
other is up to Congress,” he held, yielding the conclusion that 
“Congress’s decision to label this exaction a ‘penalty’ rather 
than a ‘tax’ is significant.”33 In short, the word “tax” has 
different meanings under the constitutional tax power and 
under the Anti-Injunction Act because, Chief Justice Roberts 
explained, the purpose of the former is a broad grant of 
legislative power while the latter is a narrow exception to 
 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 29. 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95. 
 30. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 31. 132 S. Ct. at 2582. 
 32. Id. at 2583. 
 33. Id. 
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judicial power. Under this view, the same word with the same 
dictionary definition can have different meanings, based on the 
purpose of the clause containing the word. 
In his view, Chief Justice Roberts did not reject textualism 
entirely—he just respected Congress’s decision to use the term 
“penalty” to distinguish the charge for purchasing insurance 
from other “tax” statutes: “the best evidence of Congress’s 
intent is the statutory text.”34 Yet Roberts’s view of the “text” 
as the “best evidence” was far from the Alito/Thomas/Scalia 
brand of textualism. He defined the same word, “tax,” 
differently based on statutory context and purposes—to the 
dismay of Justice Scalia, whose dissent Justices Alito and 
Thomas joined: 
What the Government would have us believe . . . is that the 
very same textual indications that show this is not a tax 
under the Anti-Injunction Act show that it is a tax under 
the Constitution. That carries verbal wizardry too far, deep 
into the forbidden land of the sophists.35 
Even more presently relevant than NFIB was when Chief 
Justice Roberts parted ways with Justice Alito as to the 
PPACA in a second case, but this time as to statutory 
interpretation, in King v. Burwell.36 In King, Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote the majority opinion saving the health law from 
a drafting glitch that arguably disallowed federal subsidies in 
various states.37 The statute providing subsidies references 
individuals in “an Exchange established by the State,” rather 
than by the federal government, so Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito deemed it “quite absurd” for the federal government 
to argue “that when the . . . Act says ‘Exchange established by 
the State’ it means ‘Exchange established by the State or the 
Federal Government.’”38 Their logic was strong under their 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 2656 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphases added). 
 36. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 37. Id. at  2487–88 (so holding, after framing the issue as follows: “The parties 
dispute whether Section 36B authorizes tax credits for individuals who enroll in 
an insurance plan through a Federal Exchange. Petitioners argue that a Federal 
Exchange is not ‘an Exchange established by the State’ . . . . The Government 
responds that . . . the phrase ‘an Exchange established by the State’ . . . should be 
read to include Federal Exchanges.”). 
 38. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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purely textual reading; Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion 
upheld nationwide subsidies, with logic that was no less strong 
but that instead relied heavily on perceived statutory purpose: 
Given that the text is ambiguous, we must turn to the 
broader structure . . . “because only one of the permissible 
meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible 
with the rest of the law.” Here, the statutory scheme 
compels us to reject petitioners’ interpretation because it 
would destabilize the individual insurance market in any 
State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very 
“death spirals” that Congress designed the Act to avoid. “We 
cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated 
purposes.”39 
Explaining the Roberts votes in NFIB and King is an 
active parlor game. Some argue that his role as Chief Justice 
made him fear that striking down “Obamacare” would draft the 
Court into the nation’s most charged political controversy.40 
The aphorism that hard cases make bad law is unclear about 
what makes cases “hard”; similarly ambiguous is the less 
judgmental aphorism: “Great cases, like hard cases, make bad 
law.”41 But even if not all “hard” or “great” cases make bad law, 
the Court essentially conceded that highly political cases yield 
idiosyncratic law when Bush v. Gore famously warned against 
applying its holding as precedent: “Our consideration is limited 
to the present circumstances”42—a pronouncement derided as 
 
 39. Id. at 2492–93 (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988), and New York State Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419–20 (1973), respectively). 
 40. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw Jr., The Paradox of the Obamacare Decision: 
How Can the Federal Government have Limited Unlimited Power?, 65 FLA. L. 
REV. 1993, 1997 (2013) (recounting arguments that Roberts “sought to preserve 
the Court’s image as an institution governed by law rather than politics, as the 
public would perceive that the outcome was contrary to his political views and 
showed . . . deference to the elected branches (and to voters, who could decide the 
fate of Obamacare . . . .)”); Gregory P. Magarian, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
Individual Mandate: The Lawless Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 15, 16 (2013) (“I share the prevalent assumption that the Chief 
Justice voted to uphold the individual mandate out of a deeply held concern for 
the Court’s institutional reputation.”). 
 41. Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual 
History, 90 GEO. L.J. 113, 115 (2001) (quoting N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 
U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904)) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 42. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
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“not how the legal system operates [because] [d]ecisions do 
create precedents,”43 or even as “hypocrisy” or “rank 
partisanship.”44 If, as some argue, Bush v. Gore reflected a 
Court adjudicating based on partisanship or a perceived need 
to end a controversy, then perhaps NFIB and King show the 
same. Or perhaps they show the opposite: a Court wary of 
upsetting the political apple cart again, as it did in Bush v. 
Gore. 
A competing, more accusatory observation is that Chief 
Justice Roberts’s votes “for” the PPACA simply showed he was 
not the conservative many thought. That diagnosis is 
embedded in the many writings by commentators45 and 
litigators46 claiming surprise at Roberts’s votes with the 
majorities upholding the health care law. Roberts’s second such 
 
 43. Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY. 
U. L.J. 1, 17 (2002). 
  44. Richard A. Posner, The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical and 
Legal Analysis, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 37–38 (2004). Posner asserts: 
[The] two most conservative Justices, Scalia and Thomas[,] . . . had gone 
out of their way . . . to urge a concept of adjudication that is inconsistent 
with the majority opinion that they joined . . . . Scalia’s statement [was] 
that when he writes a majority opinion, he limits his freedom of action: 
“If the next case should have such different facts that my political or 
policy preferences regarding the outcomes are quite the opposite, I will 
be unable to indulge those preferences” . . . How does this square with 
the statement . . . “our consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances . . . ”? It does not, thus inviting charges of hypocrisy, or 
worse—the charge of rank partisanship . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 45. See, e.g., Brian G. Gilmore, Brown v. Board of Education and National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: A Comparative Analysis of Social 
Change, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 621, 622–23 (2014) (“It was a surprise 
decision by Justice Roberts, as the conservative jurist voted with . . . four Justices 
typically associated with more liberal jurisprudence. The recognized 
conservatives . . . were left to dissent . . . when Roberts, a Justice with solid 
conservative credentials, voted in favor of the law.”); Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, 
Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks: SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883, 884 (2013) (calling Roberts’ Sebelius vote a 
“significant surprise”). 
 46. See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald B. Stuart, Two Years Later and 
Counting: The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Taxing Power Decision on the 
Goals of the Affordable Care Act, 17 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 219, 261 n.350 
(2014) (former Bush administration Attorney General and a business litigator 
“discussing the conservative backlash and criticisms of Chief Justice Roberts in 
the wake of his ‘surprise majority opinion’”); Clint Bolick, Judicial Control: Up for 
Grabs, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Aug. 2012, at 14 (conservative litigator noting that 
“conservatives are surprised and disappointed with . . . Roberts’s vote to uphold 
Obamacare”). 
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vote (Burwell) was a bit less of a surprise after his first such 
vote (NFIB), but it was no less disappointing to 
conservatives.47 
But Roberts’s rulings may not be a sign that he lacks 
conservative values, or that he placed his role as Chief Justice 
over such values. His refusal to strike down a major federal law 
on textualist logic would not have been as surprising if more 
attention were paid to certain of his prior statements on legal 
interpretation. 
Roberts famously said little of substance at his 2005 
Senate confirmation hearings,48 but it went surprisingly little-
noticed in 2005 that Roberts had said quite a bit more at his 
2003 Senate confirmation hearings for his Court of Appeals 
seat. Pressed about methods of interpretation as an under-the-
radar appellate nominee, Roberts forthcomingly elaborated an 
eclectic view of interpretation deeply at odds with the laser-like 
textual focus of a Scalia, Thomas, or Alito. In interpreting the 
Seventh Amendment jury trial right, a “very historical 
approach” is appropriate, Roberts said, consistent with the 
Scalia brand of textualism infused with historical research only 
 
 47. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Supreme Restraint: John Roberts Marks 10 Years 
As Chief Justice by Taking the Long View, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 2015, 
at 54, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/john_roberts_marks_10_years_
as_chief_justice_by_taking_the_long_view (last visited Jul. 16, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/RC99-CXJY] (“As if scripted by a screenwriter, Roberts wrote the 
majority opinion for the court in King v. Burwell, which again sided with 
President Barack Obama’s administration in upholding the president’s signature 
health care law. Despite Roberts’s track record as a reliable conservative on many 
issues, the ACA decision reinforced doubts among many on the political right 
about his commitment to conservative ideals.”); Ilya Shapiro, Introduction: Cato 
Supreme Court Review, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5 (“The sad thing about this 
entire episode is that the Chief Justice . . . damaged his own reputation by making 
this move after months of warnings . . . that striking down the law would be 
‘conservative judicial activism’ . . . . Had the Court struck down Obamacare, it 
would have ‘simply’ been a very high-profile legal ruling . . . . Instead, we have a 
political or otherwise strategic decision dressed up in legal robes . . . . Roberts, in 
refraining from making that hard balls-and-strikes call . . . , has shown why we 
don’t want our judges playing politics.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts Hearings 
Junk the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2 
(2006) (noting, but partly rejecting, the prevailing view that in “[Judiciary] 
Committee[] hearings on . . . Roberts’ nomination for Chief Justice[,] . . . the 
coverage . . . has been predominantly negative . . . . Committee members have 
been derided as timid and inept in their questioning, while [Roberts] was 
criticized as evasive, avoiding any clear picture of what his approach to major 
issues would be.”). 
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into the original meanings of the words in the text.49 But 
Roberts then espoused other, very different interpretive views: 
for the Fourth Amendment search and seizure provisions, “you 
have to look beyond the text” because it is “difficult to say just 
based on the text what’s unreasonable and what’s not”;50 and 
for the Eleventh Amendment, “strict adherence to the text 
doesn’t give you what the Supreme Court says are the right 
answers.”51 
Nothing in Roberts’s history hints that he was less 
Republican or conservative than Alito. But his 2003 comments 
hinted at what we saw in the health care cases a decade later: 
Roberts is not the textualist Alito is; and even if they vote 
together in over 90% of cases, their differences in the other 
nearly 10% can matter a great deal. Thus, the Roberts-Alito 
split traces to their divergent views on textualism, not to 
simple ideology. As detailed below, the same divergence as to 
textualism appears among federal district judges. 
II. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES’ SIMILARLY VARIED VIEWS ON 
TEXTUALISM: STRIKING DIFFERENCES IN USE OF 
DICTIONARIES TO DECIDE THE MEANING OF TEXT 
This Part documents that federal district judges display 
methodological differences similar to the Roberts-Alito 
divergence as to dictionary-driven textualism. While 
dictionaries might seem too ubiquitous a tool of legal analysis 
to vary among judges, Section II.A details, based on analysis of 
a sample of judicial opinions, how district judges do vary 
greatly in the frequency and depth of their reliance upon 
dictionary definitions to determine the meanings of disputed 
texts. Section II.B then details, based on an analysis of selected 
conservative and liberal district judges, how reliance upon 
 
 49. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of John G. Roberts, 
Nominee to be Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit) (“We take a very 
historical approach to deciding whether you have a right to a jury trial because of 
the way the Seventh Amendment is worded.”). 
 50. Id. (“Unreasonable searches and seizures, that’s a little more difficult to 
say just based on the text I know what’s unreasonable and what’s not. You have to 
look beyond the text in interpreting that.”). 
 51. Id. (“[W]hen you get to the Eleventh Amendment, the one thing we know 
from the Supreme Court’s decision is that strict adherence to a text doesn’t give 
you what the Supreme Court says are the right answers. You have to look at the 
historical context a little more . . . .”). 
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dictionary definitions does not appear to correlate closely with 
judicial ideology—contrary to extensive conventional wisdom 
that dictionary-driven textualism is a form of conservative 
judging that liberal jurists predominantly reject. 
A. Similar Textualism Variation Among District Judges: 
Twenty-Five Years of Data on Dictionary Reliance by 
One District’s Judges 
As the 93% Roberts-Alito voting overlap shows, Supreme 
Court coalition-building tends to mute methodological 
differences. Justices do not always dissent or concur separately 
when agreeing on conclusions while disagreeing on analysis; 
Roberts joined Alito’s dictionary-driven opinion in Kellogg 
Brown & Root while Alito joined Roberts’s policy-driven opinion 
in MacLean. But in the lower courts, when only one, two, or 
three judges determine the decision, judges’ individual methods 
of decision making can be far more dispositive. 
Do federal district judges show differences, like that 
between Roberts and Alito, in their affinity for textualist 
analysis? The answer is a clear “yes.” For each federal district 
judge in the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado in the past twenty-five years,52 I tallied how many 
decisions cited any of the three major mass-market English 
dictionaries53 with a search for opinions by the particular judge 
 
 52. While most of the included district judges were not on the bench for all 
twenty-five years from 1991 to 2015, I excluded only the two judges whose tenure 
included too small a portion of the twenty-five-year period to feature enough 
opinions to study: Judge Arraj had just two opinions, and Judge Carrigan had 
only 106 opinions, in the early 1990s. Given that dictionary usage ranges from 
roughly 0–3% for all district judges, roughly a hundred opinions or fewer seemed 
too small a sample to include in the study. 
 53. I considered any Webster’s, Oxford, or American Heritage dictionary. 
Those are the three best-selling dictionaries on Amazon, but in reality, Webster’s 
has the overwhelming majority of the market share of judicial citations: in the 
twenty-five years of Colorado district opinions reviewed, there were 126 citations 
to Webster’s, but barely one-quarter as many (33) to the Oxford English 
Dictionary and barely one-fifth as many (26) to the American Heritage Dictionary. 
I did not include Black’s Law Dictionary, because it is such a different resource 
from lay dictionaries; Black’s defines mainly legal terms, so courts often cite it for 
specialized legal terms, not the ordinary English terms for which courts might cite 
Webster’s or other mass-market dictionaries. See, e.g., McLean v. Air Methods 
Corp., No. 1:12-CV-241-JGM, 2014 WL 2327045, at *2 (D. Vt. May 29, 2014) 
(using Black’s for definition of “proximate cause”); Davidson v. Golden Living 
Ctr.–Mountainview, No. 4:09-CV-94, 2010 WL 3155989, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 
2010) (using Black’s for definition of “negligence per se”). 
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that cited any of those dictionaries.54 I then tallied how many 
opinions, total, each judge wrote, to allow a calculation of the 
percentage of each district judge’s opinions that cited one of 
those major dictionaries. This is a methodology others have 
used to analyze the Supreme Court and various federal circuit 
courts,55 but not district judges—an unfortunate example of 
the academic inclination to study appellate rather than district 
courts. For litigators, studies of judges’ methodologies arguably 
are more useful as to district rather than appellate judges. 
District judges sit individually, not in panels, so a litigator who 
knows the methodology of his or her district judge knows 
exactly how the court’s unitary decision-maker thinks. In 
contrast, an appellate litigator at most can learn the 
potentially differing methodologies of varied appellate panel 
members, without knowing which judge’s methodology might 
prevail in a particular case. 
Table 1 contains the findings on dictionary citation by 
district judges in the District of Colorado from 1991 through 
2015; Tables 2 and 3, in Section II.B below, contain the 
findings as to selected other judges in different federal judicial 
districts. The columns show the following: (1) the name of each 
judge; (2) the judge’s number of opinions citing dictionaries; (3) 
the judge’s total number of opinions; (4) the judge’s percentage 
of opinions citing dictionaries (i.e., column 2 divided by column 
3); and (5) the z-score of the difference between that judge’s 
dictionary-citing rate and the average rate of all judges 
examined. The z-score is a measure of how likely a judge’s 
above- or below-average dictionary-citing rate is a real 
 
 54. A separate search was conducted for each judge in the Westlaw database 
for federal district court decisions (“DCT”):  JU( [last name of judge] ) & DA(after 
12/31/1990) & DA(before 1/1/2016) & ((Webster! “American Heritage” Oxford) /6 
Dictionary). I then eliminated any opinions from a different judge who might have 
had the same last name. 
 55. E.g., John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in 
Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484 (2014) 
(analyzing “a comprehensive dataset covering dictionary usage in every Supreme 
Court and circuit court opinion from 1950 to 2010”); Joseph Scott Miller & James 
A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent 
Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 832–33 (2005) (noting initially that 
“[o]ver the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied on 
dictionaries to explain its constructions of legal text,” and proceeding to detail a 
study documenting “that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . 
which hears all appeals arising under the U.S. patent laws, has also turned 
increasingly to dictionaries when explaining its constructions of disputed terms in 
patent claims”). 
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tendency or the result of random chance (e.g., perhaps the 
judge randomly had more or fewer cases implicating word 
definitions). A score of 2.0 or more (or under -2.0), for example, 
means the judge’s dictionary-citing rate differed from the 
average (here, 1.47%) greatly enough that there is only an 
approximately 5% probability that difference resulted from 
random chance; a score of 1.65 (or -1.65) means only a roughly 
10% probability that difference traces to random chance.56  
 
 56. These statistical significance calculations are premised on assumptions 
that real-world social science data sets rarely fulfill perfectly, such as a bell-curve-
shaped normal distribution of the variable (here, dictionary-citing rate). That 
said, the distribution of judges’ dictionary-citing rates (those in Tables 1–3 
combined) does appear somewhat bell-curve-like, with a peak between roughly 1.0 
and 1.6, somewhat fewer in the 0.5–1.0 and 1.6–2.2 range, and scattered points 
near zero and above 3.0. 
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Table 1: 
Opinions by Federal District Judges in the District of Colorado 














Nottingham 18 495 3.64% 4.02 
John L.   
Kane 15 936 1.60% 0.34 
Marcia S.  
Krieger 25 1300 1.54% 0.22 
Christine 
Arguello 19 1333 1.43% -0.11 
Richard  
Matsch 8 595 1.34% -0.26 
Philip A. 
Brimmer 22 1854 1.19% -0.99 
Raymond P. 
Moore 3 303 0.99% -0.69 
Lewis T. 
Babcock 20 2317 0.86% -2.43 
Wiley Y.  
Daniel 14 1688 0.83% -2.18 
Walker  
Miller 6 763 0.79% -1.56 
Robert E. 
Blackburn 11 1984 0.55% -3.40 
William J. 
Martinez 4 775 0.52% -2.19 
R. Brooke 
Jackson 1 566 0.18% -2.55 
 
As with any quantitative analysis, there are caveats about 
what this one might omit. It does not consider other 
dictionaries, for example. But given that Webster’s is cited four 
to five times as often as the other leading dictionaries,57 
considering dictionaries beyond the top several is unlikely to 
 
 57. See supra note 53. 
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make a material difference, much less help low-dictionary-
usage judges catch up to those using dictionaries two to ten 
times as often. The data also fails to consider that some senior 
judges may have fewer criminal cases, which conceivably could 
make their caseloads different. But it is not clear whether 
criminal and civil cases meaningfully differ in how often they 
implicate dictionary definitions—and random assignment still 
predominates enough that caseload differences are unlikely to 
explain why some judges cite dictionaries so much more than 
others. 
Despite any caveats, it is hard to ignore the simple fact: 
some judges, on the Supreme Court and in this district alike, 
find dictionary-based textual reasoning more persuasive than 
others—a fact lawyers should (and likely do) know. Litigators 
with cases before Judge Nottingham, for example, should (and 
likely would) know to make textual arguments that might not 
be as strategic to make (or to focus on) with judges who almost 
never cite dictionaries, such as Judges Daniel, Jackson, 
Martinez, or Moore. 
And the anecdotes confirm the data: the ways in which the 
judges cite dictionaries show how differently they view 
dictionaries as persuasive textualist authority. The judges who 
rarely cite dictionaries tend to cite them to respond to parties’ 
own dictionary-based arguments or as mere secondary 
supporting authority for holdings they support mainly with 
caselaw, drawing more primary support from caselaw and 
other legal authorities. The one time Judge Jackson cited a 
dictionary, it was because one of the parties made “reference to 
a dictionary definition” as “extrinsic evidence” supporting its 
patent interpretation.58 Of Judge Martinez’s four decisions 
citing dictionaries, the most detailed was the one below, which 
relied primarily on prior caselaw interpreting the statute, 
citing only dictionaries submitted in court filings (as shown by 
their “ECF” docket citations), and only as a “see also” following 
the caselaw citations: 
[A]n alien who commits any offense . . . is subject to 
mandatory detention “when the alien is released.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c)(1). Mr. Beltran argues that . . . does not apply to 
 
 58. Cellport Sys., Inc. v. Peiker Acustic GmbH & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 
1304 (D. Colo. 2012). 
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him because immigration officials detained him several 
years after he was released . . . . The Court finds that the 
plain meaning of “when” . . . imposes a temporal limitation 
on when mandatory detention should apply and does not 
authorize . . . detain[ing] . . . any time after release . . . . 
Castillo-Hernandez . . . (citing Castaneda v. Souza . . . ); 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY . . . (defining “when” as “at 
the time that” . . . ) (ECF No. 18-5 . . . ); THE OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY . . . (defining “when” as “in reference 
to a definite actual occurrence or fact . . . . at the time that, 
on the occasion that”) (ECF No. 18-5 . . . ). Mr. Beltran’s 
detention . . . five years after his release . . . does not satisfy 
the statutory directive of detention “when . . . released.” The 
Court rejects Respondents’ efforts to read an ambiguity into 
the statute for the reasons discussed by . . . Castillo-
Hernandez and . . . Baquera . . . . [T]he statute requires . . . 
officials to detain . . . at the time the alien is released . . . for 
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) to apply.59 
The judges rarely citing dictionaries are not at all like 
Justice Alito, who in Kellogg Brown & Root cited dictionaries 
more often, and as more primary authority, than caselaw.60 
Paralleling Justice Alito, Judge Nottingham relied almost 
entirely on legal and lay dictionaries to decide the key issue: 
does water damage caused by a vandalized sprinkler qualify as 
damage “caused by vandalism” that the insurer need not cover? 
To Judge Nottingham, the answer depended less on contract 
law or insurance law than on dictionary definitions of 
“vandalism”: 
Plaintiffs assert that . . . dictionary consultation is 
appropriate to understand the term. . . . The court 
agrees. . . . Plaintiffs cite the widely-recognized Black’s law 
dictionary and Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary to 
establish that “vandalism” is . . . either “willful or ignorant 
destruction of public or private property” or “willful or 
malicious destruction or defacement of public or private 
property.” . . . Plaintiffs then turn to the [insurance] report, 
 
 59. Beltran v. Holder, No. 13-CV-03067-WJM, 2014 WL 1491250, at *4–6 (D. 
Colo. Jan. 21, 2014) (citations omitted), vacated in part, 2014 WL 321369 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 29, 2014). 
 60. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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which indicates that “the cause of the failure of the subject 
sprinkler head was from deliberate tampering . . . .” 
Any variance between “vandalism” and “deliberate 
tampering” is . . . without a difference. “Deliberate” is 
defined as “characterized by or resulting from slow, careful, 
thorough calculation and consideration of effects or 
consequences: not hasty, rash, or thoughtless.” WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 596. . . . “To tamper” is defined as 
“to interfere so as to weaken or change for the worse.” Id. at 
2336. . . . How slowly and carefully calculated interference 
so as to weaken or worsen could be characterized as 
anything other than purposeful destruction escapes this 
court . . . . Given the facts as presented, the court finds that 
Plaintiffs have failed to raise an issue of fact concerning the 
applicability of the vandalism limitation.61 
In sum, judges citing dictionaries less often (e.g., Martinez 
and Jackson) typically also rely on them less deeply than judges 
(e.g., Nottingham and Alito) who cite dictionaries more often 
and as more authoritative sources. 
B. Textualism’s Non-Correlation with Ideology: The 
Court’s Mixed-Ideology Caselaw, and Data on 
Conservative and Liberal District Judges 
The most conservative three Justices (Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito) cite dictionaries far more than other current or prior 
justices,62 giving their “textualist interpretation” of statutes a 
reputation as the “conservative perspective on statutory 
interpretation.”63 Textualism is inherently narrowing, making 
 
 61. Saiz v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., No. 06 CV 01144-EWN-BNB, 2007 WL 
2701398, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2007), aff’d, 299 F. App’x 836 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 62. Calhoun, supra note 55, at 490 (“[T]extualist judges like Justices Scalia 
and Thomas do in fact cite dictionaries in a higher percentage of their opinions 
than non-textualist judges like Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.”). 
 63. Ramona L. Paetzold, Supreme Court’s 2005–2006 Term Employment Law 
Cases: Do New Justices Imply New Directions?, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 303, 
348–49 (2006). Though beyond the scope of this Article, it bears mention that 
some argue that notionally “textualist” Justices implicitly rely on non-textual 
values and policy arguments. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two 
Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 
25, 25–26 (1994) (so noting as to constitutional textualism, detailing how, despite 
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it a conservative way for judges to read the remedial statutes 
they frequently interpret, some argue: “Barring judges from 
looking at the history of a statute and confining them strictly to 
its text means that the statute will only apply in those 
instances that Congress explicitly passes upon. The scope of 
governmental regulation is thereby constricted.”64 More bluntly 
put, “textualism arguably makes it more difficult for Congress 
to achieve its underlying objectives because courts have a 
tendency to interpret the law in a relatively stingy fashion.”65 
Or conservative judges may simply dislike the liberal slant of 
the legislative history of most modern remedial statutes—a 
suggested explanation for conservative judges’ “ungenerous 
approach to statutes” by William Eskridge: “the debating 
history of federal statutes, most of which were enacted by 
Democratic Congresses[,] . . . [is] slanted . . . in a more 
regulatory-state direction.”66 
But the broader Supreme Court jurisprudence, and this 
Article’s district judge data, show that it is overly simplistic to 
say that textualism is “conservative,” or to declare that 
“[s]tatutory textualism has adherents . . . throughout the 
federal judiciary, and . . . almost all of them are politically 
conservative.”67 As statutory interpretation scholar Margaret 
 
Justices Hugo Black’s and Antonin Scalia’s “intense and persistent proclamations 
of fidelity to . . . text . . . , neither Justice has avoided basing his interpretation . . . 
on values not grounded in the text. Both have relied heavily on their personal and 
political judgments regarding the role of the federal judiciary . . . .”). This Article 
takes no side as to such arguments that valueless textualism is impossible, or at 
least more rare than textualists acknowledge; whether or not that argument is 
true does not affect this Article’s more empirical point that textualism, as 
currently practiced, is not as uniformly conservative as commonly assumed. 
 64. Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory 
Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 68 (1991). 
 65. Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 143, 183 n.178 (2009); see also Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of 
National Government: Justice Stevens’s Stand Against Judicial Subversion of 
Progressive Laws and Lawmaking, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 769, 786 (2012) (“[I]n the 
great majority of cases in which the challenge is to choose among plausible 
alternative interpretations of nondefinitive statutory words, . . . the practical 
effect of the rigidities of contemporary conservatives’ textualist doctrine is to deny 
judges the most commonsense options for resolving ambiguities—thoughtful 
analysis of reliable indicia of purpose and legislative history materials 
generally.”). 
 66. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 1509, 1522 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)). 
 67. Paul Killebrew, Where Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1895, 1895 (2007); see also Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. 
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Lemos notes, “textualism is not inherently conservative in 
design, nor does it reliably produce conservative results.”68 But 
while “the theory of textualism is not conservative, the broader 
practice of textualism surely is”—at least on the modern Court. 
Lemos details: 
[C]onservatives embraced textualism in statutory 
interpretation (together with originalism in constitutional 
interpretation) as the antidotes to the “judicial activism” of 
the Warren and Burger Courts. Textualism and originalism 
were united in their appeal to judicial restraint and their 
challenge to the legal status quo. Adopting the language of 
methodology therefore gave . . . [a] means of critiquing 
existing law and pushing for legal change . . . . [I]t became 
clear that the “new textualism” was a force for moving the 
law to the right . . . .69 
Because the ideological implications of textualism are 
nuanced, as Lemos notes, the modern Court’s brand of 
statutory textualism has generated a number of conservative 
outcomes, but also more ideologically mixed outcomes than is 
often acknowledged. To be sure, statutory textualism can yield 
conservative decisions by construing remedial statutes strictly: 
“Our inquiry . . . must focus on the text,” Justice Thomas wrote 
for the majority in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,70 
citing multiple dictionaries contemporaneous with relevant 
statutory enactments to impose a stricter causation standard 
under the age discrimination statute (the ADEA) than under 
the race, gender, and religious discrimination statute (Title 
 
REV. 347, 373 (2005) (“Some of the differences may simply boil down to politics; 
today’s textualists tend to be politically conservative . . . .”); Alexander Volokh, 
Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 829 (2008) (making the argument in more nuanced form: 
“accepting that some judges select interpretive methods at least partly by 
ideology[,] a plausible theory explaining the apparent determinacy of textualism 
is that textualist judges, who are on average more conservative, have 
systematically disagreed more often with agency interpretations, and have 
therefore found a plain meaning in order to substitute their more conservative 
understanding of the statute”). 
 68. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation: Reading 
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. By Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, 
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 853 (2013). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009). 
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VII).71 
Yet textualism has yielded outcomes in favor of civil rights 
plaintiffs too: “Our precedents make clear that the starting 
point for our analysis is the statutory text,” Justice Thomas 
also wrote for a unanimous Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa,72 imposing a less strict Title VII causation standard 
because of one word in the statutory causation language: 
[If] words of the statute are unambiguous, the judicial 
inquiry is complete . . . . [Title VII] unambiguously states 
that a plaintiff need only “demonstrat[e]” that an employer 
used a forbidden consideration . . . . On its face, the statute 
does not . . . require[] . . . a heightened showing through 
direct evidence.73 
Justice Scalia expressly detailed a key reason that 
textualism can yield broad interpretations of remedial statutes 
in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.74: that 
sometimes, lawyers and judges can conclude that the text goes 
further than a decades-ago Congress had intended. In Oncale, 
Justice Scalia used textualism to hold that Title VII bars same-
sex harassment, even though that holding went well beyond 
the actual purposes of the 1964 Congress: 
[M]ale-on-male sexual harassment . . . was assuredly not 
the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it 
enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go 
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils[.] [A]nd it is ultimately the provisions of our laws 
rather than . . . concerns of our legislators by which we are 
governed.75 
Justice Alito’s textualism-based ruling for a plaintiff in 
Kellogg Brown & Root fits easily into the above Scalia-Thomas 
 
 71. Id. at 175–76 (“‘Statutory construction must begin with the language 
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’ . . . The words ‘because of’ 
mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’”) (citing three dictionaries, including two from 
1966, a year before ADEA enactment; other citations omitted). 
 72. 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003). 
 73. Id. at 98–99 (citations omitted). 
 74. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 75. Id. 
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pro-plaintiff textualist caselaw: textualism is a tool; while it 
can yield limited-to-the-words narrow readings of remedial 
statutes, it can support broader-than-intended readings of 
remedial statutes too. 
The district judge data shows the same, but even more 
strongly. Though decades of dictionary citations by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas have given the practice a conservative 
reputation, among the broader federal judiciary there is little, 
if any, correlation between judges’ reliance upon dictionaries 
and their reputations as conservatives or liberals. The District 
of Colorado’s #2 dictionary user, Judge Kane,76 is a liberal 
icon,77 and a review of famously conservative and liberal judges 
outside the district shows that their dictionary usage varies 
greatly. 
Review of five district judges with a record or reputation as 
conservatives,78 and five with a record or reputation as 
 
 76. Judge Kane’s 1.60% dictionary-citing rate comes with a z-score of 0.34, 
which indicates that his rate is not above average to a statistically significant 
degree. Yet that rate is higher than that of many other judges in the district to a 
statistically significant degree, as shown by comparison to the three judges 
appointed by President Obama: Kane’s rate is significantly higher than those of 
Judges William J. Martinez (0.52%, with a z-score of -2.19) and R. Brooke Jackson 
(0.18%, with a z-score of -2.55); Kane’s rate also is higher than that of Judge 
Raymond P. Moore (0.99%), just not quite to a statistically significant degree, in 
large part because the recency of Moore’s appointment limits his sample size. 
 77. See Kirk Mitchell, Feisty Federal Judge in Denver Knows All About 
Challenging Authority, DENVER POST, Aug. 3, 2014, noting: 
Early in Kane’s judicial career, a Colorado prisoner sued the state 
claiming that his cramped prison cell . . . violated his constitutional 
rights. When Kane refused to dismiss the case and demanded that the 
state abide a federal standard of holding inmates in cells that were at 
least 72-square feet, it set off a maelstrom of outrage by legislators who 
claimed it would bankrupt the state. Kane was not swayed . . . . His 
decision withstood appeals and in more than 30 years since then has 
been cited as a standard of law throughout the country. What irks the 
judge more than anything is encountering leaders who abuse their 
authority, he said. “People who are subject to the whims and caprice of 
other people,” Kane said . . . . 
 78. I chose the five reputedly conservative federal district judges as follows: 
Four were those who had the most high-profile conservative rulings of the past 
several years (each detailed below); the fifth, Judge Mukasey, was appointed to be 
United States Attorney General, making him the district judge who subsequently 
held the highest-profile public office above that of a United States District Judge. 
•Two were appointees of President George W. Bush who ruled against 
the Obama administration in high-profile cases. Judge Rosemary M. 
Collyer (D. D.C.) ruled that the House of Representatives had standing 
to sue the Obama administration over appropriations for the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 
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liberals,79 corroborates the lack of correlation between ideology 
 
130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015). Judge Andrew S. Hanen (S.D. Tex.) 
ruled against the Obama administration’s action to grant deferral of 
deportation action and work authorization to certain undocumented 
immigrants. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) 
aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
•Judge Amul Roger Thapar (E.D. Ky.) drew initial attention as a 
Federalist Society member nominated by President Bush at age 38, then 
for issuing lengthy sentences in a high-profile case of peace protesters 
who broke into a nuclear facility. Associated Press, Nun, 84, gets 3 years 
in prison for breaking into nuclear weapons complex, CBS NEWS (Feb. 18, 
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nun-84-gets-3-years-in-prison-for-
breaking-in-nuclear-weapons-complex/  (last visited Jan. 15, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/PBX8-HSXK] (“Judge Amul Thapar said he was 
concerned they showed no remorse and he wanted the punishment to be 
a deterrent for other activists.”). 
•Judge Michael Mukasey (S.D.N.Y.) was appointed a district judge by 
President Ronald Reagan, then appointed Attorney General by President 
George W. Bush. 
•Judge Rudolph Randa (E.D. Wis.), another Reagan appointee, is a 
Federalist Society advisor with controversial rulings against criminal 
defendants and in politically charged cases. Daniel Bice, Federal Judges 
Lynn Adelman, Rudolph Randa Are Polar Opposites, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL (May 10, 2014) (“Randa threw out a federal law . . . [on] access 
to abortion clinics . . . [and] was reversed . . . . Randa ordered . . . [a] 
state purchasing official . . . jailed while she appealed her conviction for 
steering a travel contract . . . to supporters of then-Gov. Jim Doyle . . . . 
The appeals court . . . call[ed] the evidence ‘beyond thin,’ order[ing] 
her . . . freed immediately. . . . Randa was overturned for forcing a 
prisoner to wear prison garb . . . during his civil rights case . . . . Judge 
Richard Posner wrote that . . . prisoner clothing in front of a jury is 
‘highly prejudicial.’”). 
 79. I chose the five reportedly liberal federal district judges as follows. One 
(Sotomayor) was the only Democratic appointee to the United States Supreme 
Court in decades to have been a United States District Judge; one (Jenkins) was 
the district judge who approved the highest profile civil rights class action of 
recent decades, one that subsequently led the Supreme Court to reshape class 
action law by reversing his decision; the three others (Gertner, Bennett, and 
Adelman) are widely known, as detailed by the below citations to their writings 
and media coverage, as the most prominent and outspoken liberal district judges 
in recent decades. 
•Sonia Sotomayor was a district judge (S.D.N.Y.) before her promotion to 
the Second Circuit and then the United States Supreme Court in 2009 by 
President Barack Obama. 
•Judge Nancy Gertner (D. Mass.), appointed by President Bill Clinton, 
issued controversial rulings such as barring mandatory arbitration in 
discrimination cases, Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998), and became all the more 
outspoken after retiring. E.g., Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 109, 117 (Oct. 16, 2012) (claiming that judges are trained “to 
get rid of civil rights cases”: “At the start of my judicial career . . . , the 
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and dictionary reliance. Among the reputed conservatives, only 
one of the five cites dictionaries at roughly Judge Nottingham’s 
high 3% rate; two others are relatively high at roughly 2%, but 
two others are near 1%. Among the reputed liberals, the 
numbers are strikingly similar: one around 3%; two just over 
2%; and two near 1.5%.  
 
trainer teaching discrimination law to new judges announced, ‘Here’s 
how to get rid of civil rights cases . . . .’”); Conor Friedersdorf, Federal 
Judge: My Drug War Sentences Were Unfair and Disproportionate, 
ATLANTIC, June 29, 2015 (“Gertner . . . compares the damage caused by 
drug prohibition to the destruction of cities in World War II.”). 
•Judge Mark W. Bennett (N.D. Ia.), also a Clinton appointee, argues 
that “the time has come to bury summary judgment” because of its 
“abuse and overuse by my federal judge colleagues,” especially in 
discrimination cases due to docket pressure and “implicit bias in judicial 
decisions.” Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No 
Summary Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to 
the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: 
One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 686 
(2013). 
•Judge Lynn Adelman (E.D. Wis.), also a Clinton appointee, issued a 
later-reversed ruling striking down a politically controversial voter 
identification law, as well as numerous controversial rulings reversing 
criminal convictions. Daniel Bice, Federal Judges Lynn Adelman, 
Rudolph Randa Are Polar Opposites, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 10, 
2014) (recounting numerous such rulings by Adelman). 
•Judge Martin Jenkins (N.D. Cal.), also appointed by President Clinton, 
certified the Wal-Mart national gender discrimination class action that 
was reversed in a 2011 Court decision disallowing such broad classes. 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004), 
aff’d, 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
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Table 2: 
Opinions by Selected Reputedly Conservative Federal Judges 




























14 1464 0.96% -1.61 
 
Table 3: 
Opinions by Selected Reputedly Liberal Federal Judges 




























10 674 1.48% 0.03 
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The above data show that district judges’ divergence as to 
textualism does not cleanly track their ideologies. This finding 
parallels the example of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito, who differ greatly as to textualism, but otherwise share 
great ideological similarities. 
These findings are not just an intellectual analysis; they 
contain a real lawyering lesson. Many district judges come to 
the bench with identifiable ideological backgrounds. Lawyers 
might naturally assume that the textualism that guides 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito to use dictionary definitions 
identically would guide the decision making of district judges 
with similar conservative reputations, and thus that a briefing 
before a judge like Rudolph Randa or Michael Mukasey should 
cite dictionary definitions and other textualist arguments that 
those judges are likely to deem persuasive. Conversely, a 
lawyer with a case before a reputedly liberal district judge like 
Mark Bennett or Nancy Gertner might naturally assume that 
such a judge would be unreceptive to the sort of dictionary-
based textualist arguments that appeal to Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito. All of those assumptions would be wrong, 
however. Judges Bennett (3.28%) and Gertner (2.31%) are 
double to triple as likely to rely on dictionaries than Judges 
Randa (0.96%) and Mukasey (1.30%). 
“[I]f you are a litigator” deciding how to advocate a 
particular interpretation, “your presumptive position in favor 
of your favorite theory will . . . be slight”: because your goal is 
to win your case, “[y]ou will thus almost always be willing to 
deviate from your favorite theory in a case where a different 
theory would work better.”80 This Article’s findings show that 
lawyers rely on erroneous stereotypes if they write briefs and 
present arguments on the assumption that textualist 
arguments persuade conservative judges, but not liberal 
judges. This is not to disagree with the conventional wisdom 
that “litigators know that the identity of the judge has a 
profound effect on the odds of winning a case, and will make 
extraordinary efforts to get their case before an ideologically 
receptive” judge or panel.81 Where this Article disagrees with 
 
 80. Volokh, supra note 67, at 839. 
 81. Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the Structural Role of 
the Supreme Court in the U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 TUL. L. REV. 181, 194 
(2011). 
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the conventional wisdom is in noting that conservative does not 
imply textualist, as is commonly assumed. The perfect overlap 
between the three most conservative Justices and the three 
most textualist Justices is a pattern that simply does not hold 
in the lower courts—an important fact for lawyers to know as 
they strategize which arguments might persuade their judges, 
and thus which arguments might help them win their cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court is an important enough institution 
that even its driest cases offer useful hints about how judges 
operate. Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean82 and 
Kellogg Brown & Root v. U.S., ex rel. Carter83 resolved 
questions of importance to narrow fields of law (federal 
employee whistleblowing and False Claims Act cases, 
respectively), but for this Article’s purposes, their import was 
what they showed about the Justices’ methodologies: that 
Justice Alito is every bit the dictionary-reliant statutory 
textualist that Justices Scalia and Thomas are; but that Chief 
Justice Roberts is more of a purposivist, relying on statutory 
history, purposes, and structure, in addition to the text itself. 
This difference sheds light on the more famous Roberts-Alito 
divergence: their repeated divergence on the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, first in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,84 then in King v. Burwell.85 
In both cases, to interpret a complex statutory scheme, Alito 
looked only to the text (e.g., a “tax” is a “tax” if and only if 
labeled as such), while Roberts looked to the policy intent of 
Congress—a clear difference in methodology that parallels 
Alito’s textualism-only analysis in Kellogg Brown & Root and 
Roberts’s pragmatic purposivism in MacLean. 
But the Roberts-Alito divergence is just an example of a 
broader judicial phenomenon: that ideologically similar judges 
can vary widely in their adherence to textualism. Textualism 
has earned a conservative reputation, but mainly from the 
specific historical context of three particular Justices joining 
the Court in an era when some conservatives saw strict textual 
 
 82. 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015). 
 83. 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015). 
 84. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 85. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
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interpretations as a way to rein in the excesses of prior rulings. 
A broader look at the Court’s jurisprudence confirms that 
textualism can yield ideologically mixed results, including 
surprising rulings for plaintiffs suing under remedial statutes. 
The District Court data and findings in this Article 
corroborate the above interpretation: that textualism need not 
be a conservative tool; and that judicial ideology does not 
clearly predict the use or rejection of textualist analysis. 
Analysis of all District of Colorado judges shows an imperfect 
at best correlation between judicial ideology and textualism, 
and a broader national analysis of five reputedly conservative 
district judges and five reputedly liberal district judges shows 
no pattern whatsoever: the most frequent dictionary-citers 
include some of the judges identified as most conservative and 
some identified as most liberal; and the most infrequent 
dictionary-citers include a similar conservative-liberal mix of 
judges. Lawyers should know this: it is too simplistic to assume 
that a reportedly conservative judge will adhere to Scalia-
brand textualism while a reportedly liberal judge will not; 
judges are individuals, and while they can display patterns in 
their methodologies, a textualism-ideology pattern is not one of 
them. 
 
